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Abstract	
Forecasting	is	an	integral	part	of	all	business	planning,	and	forecasting	the	outlook	for	
housing	is	of	interest	to	many	firms	in	the	housing	construction	sector.	This	research	
measures	the	performance	of	a	number	of	industry	forecasting	bodies;	this	is	done	to	
provide	users	with	an	indicator	of	the	value	of	housing	forecasting	undertaken	in	
Australia.	The	accuracy	of	housing	commencement	forecasts	of	three	Australian	
organisations	–	the	Housing	Industry	Association	(HIA),	the	Indicative	Planning	Council	
for	the	Housing	Industry	(IPC)	and	BIS‐Shrapnel	–	is	examined	through	the	empirical	
analysis	of	their	published	forecasts	supplemented	by	qualitative	data	in	the	form	of	
opinions	elicited	from	several	industry	“experts”	employed	in	these	organisations.	
Forecasting	performance	was	determined	by	comparing	the	housing	commencement	
forecast	with	the	actual	data	collected	by	the	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	on	an	ex‐
post	basis.	Although	the	forecasts	cover	different	time	periods,	the	level	of	accuracy	is	
similar,	at	around	11‐13	per	cent	for	four‐quarter‐ahead	forecasts.	In	addition,	national	
forecasts	are	more	accurate	than	forecasts	for	individual	states.	This	is	the	first	research	
that	has	investigated	the	accuracy	of	both	private	and	public	sector	forecasting	of	
housing	construction	in	Australia.	This	allows	users	of	the	information	to	better	
understand	the	performance	of	various	forecasting	organisations.	
Keyword(s):	Housing;	Forecasting;	Construction	industry;	Building	services;	
Australia.	
Introduction	
Forecasting	is	an	integral	part	of	all	business	planning,	and	forecasting	the	outlook	for	
housing	is	of	interest	to	many	firms	in	the	housing	construction	sector.	However,	in	
spite	of	the	importance	of	forecasting	housing	activity,	little	research	has	been	
undertaken	to	determine	the	accuracy	of	forecasts	produced	by	high	profile	forecasting	
organisations	in	Australia.	This	research	attempts	to	redress	that	situation	by	
measuring	the	performance	of	a	number	of	industry	forecasting	bodies.	This	is	done	to	
provide	an	indicator	to	users	of	the	value	of	housing	forecasting	in	Australia.	
The	housing	industry	needs	to	strategically	plan	for	the	effects	of	future	changes	in	the	
economy	and	a	number	of	public	and	private	sector	organisations	publish	activity	
forecasts	for	this	purpose.	Many	studies	have	examined	the	accuracy	of	forecasts	of	
major	economic	indicators	such	as	inflation	and	economic	growth	(McNees	and	Ries,	
1983;	Adams,	1986).	These	have	shown	that	some	economic	indicators	are	more	
consistent	than	are	others,	and	so	easier	to	predict.	In	addition,	some	economic	
indicators	change	at	different	rates	under	different	conditions,	and	at	different	times.	It	
is	important,	therefore,	to	know	the	level	of	confidence	that	can	be	placed	in	the	
forecast,	this	is	because	if	unreliable	forecasts	are	used	they	may	turn	out	to	be	
misleading.	To	do	this,	the	performance	of	economic	forecasters	needs	to	be	
consistently	monitored	and	put	into	the	context	of	the	economic	circumstances	of	the	
time.	
Very	few	studies	have	considered	the	forecasting	of	housing	commencements.	One	
study,	by	Weber	and	Devaney	(1996)	in	the	USA,	investigated	the	forecasting	accuracy	
of	housing	starts	(commencements),	in	order	to	determine	whether	consumer	
sentiment	could	be	used	to	improve	forecasts	of	the	number	of	housing	starts.	Three	
forecasting	models	were	examined	using	combinations	of	time‐series	models	with	
indices	of	housing	and	consumer	confidence.	This	involved	the	use	of	two	sentiment	
surveys:	The	University	of	Michigan’s	index	of	consumer	sentiment	(ICS)	and	the	index	
of	housing	sentiment	(IHS).	The	results	showed	that	inclusion	of	the	surveys	reduced	
the	root	mean	squared	error	(RMSE)	of	the	statistical	forecasts	by	approximately	34	per	
cent	–	the	forecasts	being	produced	using	an	error	correction	model	(ECM)	and	a	Box‐
Jenkins	auto‐regressive	integrated	moving	average	(ARIMA)	model.	The	consumer	
sentiment	measures	were	both	based	on	five	questions,	eliciting	the	respondents’	view	
of	current	business	conditions	as	well	as	their	perceptions	of	future	economic	
prospects.	In	addition,	the	IHS	survey	tracked	consumer	views	on	whether	the	current	
period	was	a	good	or	bad	time	to	buy	a	house.	While	the	IHS	forecasts	were	slightly	
more	accurate,	the	near	identical	specification	and	high	statistical	correlation	between	
the	IHS	and	ICS	forecasts	suggested	that	both	indices	reflect	similar	information	and	
neither	is	superior	to	the	other	in	forecasting	housing	starts,	a	somewhat	surprising	
finding,	given	the	more	narrowly	defined	IHS.	
Forecasting	is	an	essential	aspect	of	all	business	planning,	the	above	research	has	
shown	that	qualitative	and	quantitative	methods	can	be	used	to	make	predictions	about	
the	future	levels	of	housing	activity.	It	is	also	possible	that	different	forecasting	methods	
will	be	more	accurate	at	different	times,	or	under	different	economic	circumstances.	
However,	this	is	seldom	done	in	practice,	and	hence	the	motivation	in	this	paper	to	
determine	the	level	of	accuracy	of	forecasts	produced	by	these	organisations.	This	
research	considers	the	accuracy	of	housing	commencement	forecasts	of	three	
Australian	organisations	–	the	Housing	Industry	Association	(HIA),	the	Indicative	
Planning	Council	for	the	Housing	Industry	(IPC)	and	BIS‐Shrapnel	–	and	is	examined	
through	the	empirical	analysis	of	their	published	forecast	data.	This	is	supplemented	by	
qualitative	data	in	the	form	of	opinions	elicited	from	several	industry	“experts”	
employed	in	these	organisations.	
Method	
Forecasting	performance	was	determined	by	comparing	the	forecast	with	the	actual	
number	of	housing	commencements	for	the	period	as	collected	several	months	later	by	
the	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics.	The	forecasts	produced	by	three	organisations	were	
collected	to	analyse	the	performance	of	Australian	housing	industry	forecasting.	These	
organisations	comprised:	
1. (1)	The	HIA	–	a	private‐sector	industry	association	comprising	mainly	house	
construction	contractors.	Forecasts	produced	by	the	HIA	were	produced	by	an	
economic	forecaster	who	is	employed	to	produce	predictions	as	an	information	
service	to	members.	
2. (2)	The	IPC	–	Government	sponsored	agency	directed	by	an	industry	advisory	
board,	which	provides	housing	forecasts	for	use	by	industry	and	the	general	
public.	
3. (3)	BIS‐Shrapnel	–	a	private	sector	consultancy	firm,	which	produces	economic	
and	housing	forecasts	as	part	of	a	subscription	service	to	clients.	
Data	from	each	of	the	above	organisations	were	collected	and	examined	for	suitability	
in	determining	the	level	of	accuracy	and	bias	of	their	forecasts.	The	information	related	
to	the	forecast	of	the	number	of	housing	commencements	in	each	time	period	
(quarterly,	six‐monthly,	or	yearly).	These	forecasts	were	then	compared	with	the	actual	
number	of	commencements	for	the	period	on	an	ex‐post	basis.	
In	addition,	each	of	the	above	organisations	was	contacted	and	invited	to	comment	on	
their	methods.	The	interviewees	comprised	representatives	from:	the	Canberra	and	
Melbourne	offices	of	the	HIA;	a	senior	economist,	Master	Builders	Association	of	
Western	Australia;	and	the	deputy	executive	director,	Master	Builders	Association,	
Canberra.	During	interviews,	the	aims	of	the	forecasting	were	articulated,	together	with	
the	costs	associated	with	producing	them,	and	any	other	additional	information	that	
affected	their	forecasting.	
Results	
This	research	was	limited	to	publicly	available	published	information	on	housing	
forecasts,	of	which	little	actually	exists.	The	results	of	the	analysis,	and	discussion,	of	the	
three	organisations’	forecasts	follow.	
The	HIA	
The	HIA	uses	a	combination	of	time‐series	and	judgemental	methods.	Quarterly	
forecasts	from	1983	to	1996	were	published	by	the	Victoria	office,	and	have	been	
analysed	below.	
Let	at	be	the	actual	value	for	housing	starts	at	time	t,	as	shown	in	Figure	1.	Let	fj,t	be	the	j	
quarter‐ahead	forecast	of	at	.	The	series	of	one‐quarter‐ahead	forecasts,	f	1,t	,	is	plotted	
with	at	in	Figure	2.	The	one‐quarter‐ahead	forecast	errors	are	defined	as	ej,t	=	at	–	fj,t	.	
The	one‐quarter‐ahead	forecast	errors	e	1,t	are	plotted	in	Figure	3.	
The	absolute	values	of	the	RMSE	statistics	are	not	easily	interpretable.	However,	the	
relative	values	show	that	the	forecasts	become	less	accurate	as	the	forecast	horizon	
increases.	This	is	to	be	expected,	as	it	is	more	difficult	to	forecast	further	into	the	future.	
The	same	conclusion	follows	from	the	mean	absolute	percentage	errors	(MAPE)	
statistics	–	the	average	percentage	error	is	6.11	per	cent	when	forecasting	one‐quarter	
ahead	and	18.87	per	cent	when	forecasting	seven‐quarters	ahead.	
The	U	statistic	for	one	and	two‐quarter	ahead	are	much	greater	than	one.	This	is	not	a	
good	result	because	it	shows	that	using	the	naïve	forecast	would	have	been	more	
accurate.	Naïve	forecasts	are	very	simple	and	cheap	to	calculate	and	perform	about	as	
well	or	better	than	the	HIA	forecasts	for	two‐quarter	horizons.	The	three‐quarter‐ahead	
forecasts	have	U	almost	equal	to	one,	and	the	longer	horizon	forecasts	have	U	values	
slightly	less	than	one,	which	indicates	slightly	better	forecasting.	
The	correct	direction	statistics	are	all	greater	than	50	per	cent,	and	the	bias	statistics	
are	all	negative.	Since	the	forecast	errors	are	calculated	as	ej,t	=	at	–	fj,t	,	this	means	that	
the	HIA	forecasts	(Table	I)	have	a	tendency	to	be	too	large.	However,	this	tendency	is	
statistically	significant	for	the	six	and	seven‐quarters‐ahead	forecasts	only.	
The	results	for	forecasting	efficiency	are	summarised	in	the	following	estimated	
regressions:(see	equation	1)These	equations	are	simple	autoregressions	with	the	order	
selected	using	Akaike	information	criterion	(AIC).	The	figures	in	brackets	are	t	statistics,	
which	if	greater	than	two	indicate	that	the	corresponding	coefficient	is	significantly	
different	from	zero.	A	significant	coefficient	on	a	lagged	forecast	error	indicates	forecast	
error	autocorrelation.	
The	first	equation,	for	the	four‐quarter‐ahead	prediction	errors,	shows	significant	
autocorrelation	because	of	the	significant	first	lags.	Therefore,	the	four‐quarter‐ahead	
forecasts	are	inefficient.	The	other	equation	shows	significant	inefficiency	exists	for	
forecasts	five‐quarters	ahead.	Equations	for	the	one,	two,	three,	six	and	seven‐quarters‐
ahead	forecasts	are	not	presented	because	no	significant	autocorrelation	was	found.	
For	further	visual	inspection,	graphs	of	the	forecasts	and	forecast	errors	are	given	for	
the	two	up	to	seven‐quarters‐ahead	forecasts	(Figures	4	‐9).	In	each	graph,	the	errors	
are	scaled	on	the	left	axis	and	the	forecasts	and	actual	values	on	the	right	axis.	
The	IPC	
The	IPC	was	a	government‐sponsored	organisation	that	produced	half‐yearly	forecasts,	
for	each	Australian	State	and	nationally.	Forecasts	were	collected	for	the	period	1985	to	
1998.	The	IPC	used	a	combination	of	sophisticated	econometric	models	with	an	
adjustment	based	on	subjective	inputs.	
National	forecasts	
The	summary	statistics	for	the	IPC	national	forecasts	are	given	in	Table	II.	
As	is	expected,	the	RMSE	and	MAPE	statistics	increase	with	the	forecast	horizon.	As	
mentioned	earlier,	not	too	much	should	be	made	of	comparisons	across	forecast	
horizons.	For	example,	because	all	forecasts	are	made	in	June	each	year,	the	one‐
quarter‐ahead	forecasts	are	always	forecasting	the	September	quarter	while	the	two‐
quarters‐	head	forecasts	are	forecasting	the	December	quarter.	While	the	data	are	
seasonally	adjusted,	it	is	still	possible	that	the	September	quarter	is	inherently	easier	to	
forecast	than	the	December	quarter,	or	vice	versa.	
The	U	statistics	are	good,	showing	that	the	forecasts	are	approximately	twice	as	
accurate	as	the	naïve	forecasts	in	RMSE	terms.	Therefore,	the	IPC	forecasts	do	have	
some	benefit	over	the	naïve	forecasts.	In	addition,	the	forecasts	quite	often	predict	the	
change	to	be	in	the	correct	direction,	as	much	as	92	per	cent	of	the	time.	
The	bias	statistics	are	mostly	positive,	which	means	that	there	is	a	slight	tendency	to	
under‐forecast.	This	is	particularly	the	case	for	the	four‐quarters‐ahead	forecasts	where	
the	bias	is	statistically	significant.	This	is	likely	to	be	due	to	a	one‐off	large	error	for	the	
June	quarter	of	1994	of	11,088,	or	23	per	cent,	compared	with	the	average	percentage	
error	of	10.2	per	cent.	
No	statistically	significant	evidence	of	inefficiency	was	found	in	these	forecasts	so	no	
autocorrelation	equations	are	reported.	
State	forecasts	
The	summary	forecast	statistics	for	the	IPC	forecasts	for	New	South	Wales,	Victoria,	
Queensland	and	Western	Australia	are	given	in	Tables	III	‐VI.	
The	IPC	state	forecasts	generally	share	the	same	properties	as	the	Australian	forecasts.	
That	is,	they	are	mostly	a	considerable	improvement	on	naïve	forecasts,	predict	in	the	
correct	direction	and	have	mainly	insignificant	biases.	No	evidence	of	forecast	
inefficiency	was	found.	One	interesting	point	was	that	the	IPC	generally	under‐predicted	
for	all	states	except	Victoria,	where	they	generally	over‐predicted.	
The	HIA	and	IPC	forecasts	are	for	different	time	series	over	different	but	overlapping	
time	periods.	Therefore,	only	general	qualitative	comparisons	can	be	made	between	the	
accuracy	of	the	two	sets	of	forecasts.	It	is	clear,	however,	that	the	IPC	forecasts	have	
superior	summary	statistics	to	the	HIA	forecasts.	It	is	not	possible	though	to	say	by	how	
much	they	are	superior.	
BIS‐shrapnel	
The	models	were	estimated	on	quarterly	data	from	December	1959	to	September	1980	
using	multiple	regression.	Two	approaches	were	used	to	test	the	forecasting	ability	of	
the	models.	First,	the	models’	short	term	forecasts	were	prepared	with	forecasts	based	
on	an	analysis	of	the	market	information	and	short‐term	indicators	of	movements	in	
building	activity,	e.g.	real	estate	prices	and	vacancy	rates.	
Where	necessary,	trend	forecasts	of	the	model	were	then	adjusted	by	a	constant	amount	
upward	or	downward	to	provide	a	link	with	the	short‐term	deviation	from	the	trend.	
Second,	the	model	outputs	were	reconciled	with	the	results	of	a	demographic	based	
approach.	If	the	two	approaches	yielded	significantly	different	results,	a	detailed	
examination	of	both	the	econometric	and	demographic	approaches	would	be	
undertaken.	
The	results	of	their	forecasts	show	that	BIS‐shrapnel	performed	quite	well	compared	to	
the	naïve	approach.	Forecasts	covered	the	period	from	1979	to	1998.	However,	the	
results	(Table	VII)	can	only	be	considered	as	an	indication	of	forecasting	performance.	
This	is	because	a	complete	set	of	their	forecasts	could	not	be	obtained.	
Discussion	
The	research	concentrated	on	documenting	the	relative	performance	of	forecasting	
housing	commencement	forecasts.	So	it	makes	sense	to	attempt	to	summarise	the	
forecasting	accuracy	of	the	various	organisations.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	
each	forecasting	attempt	was	produced	to	meet	a	range	of	needs.	All	the	IPC	forecasts	
are	comparable	because	they	were	all	published	at	the	same	time.	However,	the	other	
forecasts	were	produced	at	different	economic	times,	therefore	are	strictly	comparable.	
Nevertheless,	Table	VIII	outlines	the	MAPE	of	one‐year	housing	commencement	
forecasts.	
The	results	show	that	forecasting	by	the	IPC	had	different	levels	of	accuracy	for	
forecasts	at	a	national	level	compared	to	state	based	forecasts.	The	results	seem	to	
indicate	that	it	is	easier	(lower	forecasting	error	MAPE)	to	produce	national	forecasts	
than	forecasts	for	individual	states.	All	the	state‐based	forecasts	produced	by	the	IPC	
have	MAPE	within	the	range	of	11.5	per	cent	to	12	per	cent.	This	is	significantly	
different	to	the	national	forecast	MAPE	for	the	same	period	of	4.4	per	cent.	
This	conclusion	seems	to	be	validated	by	the	results	of	the	HIA	forecasts.	Table	VIII	
shows	that	although	the	HIA	forecasts	cover	a	different	time	period	to	that	of	the	IPC,	
the	level	of	accuracy	is	similar	(i.e.	11.6	per	cent	for	HIA	compared	to	11.4	per	cent	IPC,	
Vic)	Consequently,	it	is	likely	that	housing	commencements	are	more	difficult	to	predict	
at	a	state	level	than	they	are	at	a	national	level.	
Representatives	of	the	organisations	interviewed	suggested	that	if	more	current	
demographic	and	financial	data	were	available	it	would	increase	the	accuracy	of	the	
assumptions	used	in	their	models.	In	particular,	it	was	suggested	that	if	the	forecasting	
variables	were	available	at	a	regional	level	it	would	substantially	improve	their	ability	
to	estimate	demand	outside	major	state	capital	cities.	
In	addition,	the	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	(ABS)	series	related	to	housing	finance	
also	includes	a	variety	of	other	loans	that	may	not	relate	to	the	construction	of	new	
homes,	further	adding	to	the	difficulties	associated	with	determining	the	link	between	
finance,	approvals	and	commencements.	According	to	one	HIA	interviewee:	
The	problem	with	housing	finance	is	that	the	series	is	too	volatile	and,	therefore,	
statistically	unreliable	when	used	for	forecasting	purposes.		
Nevertheless,	the	housing	finance	series	remains	an	important	data	source	which	is	
relied	on	by	forecasting	organisations.	
Building	approvals	produced	by	the	ABS	is	another	series	that	was	considered	a	
problem	by	the	forecasters	interviewed.	Again,	the	interviewees	suggested	that	it	was	
becoming	statistically	unreliable	for	forecasting	purposes.	According	to	the	respondents	
the	difficulty	was	that	the	ABS	makes	many	revisions	to	the	data	and	that	this	makes	it	
more	difficult	to	use	for	forecasting	purposes.	The	ABS	current	procedure	is	only	to	
produce	estimated	data,	so	monthly	statistics	can	fluctuate	quite	significantly.	To	quote	
one	interviewee:	
Sometimes	you	have	to	go	to	the	data	on	quarterly	basis	in	order	to	get	the	information	
that	is	needed.	In	other	words,	approvals	and	finance	are	less	useful	than	they	once	
were,	and	are	becoming	less	reliable	for	forecasting	purposes.	This	is	making	housing	
forecasting	an	even	more	difficult	task.		
In	addition,	the	MBA	interviewee	suggested	that	business	sentiment	surveys	are	an	
important	indicator	of	future	prospects	for	housing.	He	suggested	that	if	more	extensive	
surveys	of	business	attitude	and	consumer	confidence	were	available	it	would	very	be	
beneficial	to	forecasters,	especially	for	short	to	medium‐term	forecasts.	This	seems	to	
support	the	research	done	by	Weber	(1996)	where	sentiment	indicators	significantly	
improved	the	accuracy	of	housing	forecasts	in	the	USA.	
Past	research	has	shown	that	different	forecasting	methods	had	different	levels	of	
performance	(Adams,	1986).	According	to	the	MBA	interviewee,	the	problem	with	
econometric	forecasting	methods	is	that	there	is	no	guarantee	that	the	exogenous	
variable	assumptions	that	underlie	the	forecast	are	correct.	This	issue	was	commented	
on	extensively	by	all	the	forecasters	interviewed.	The	HIA	senior	economist	suggested	
that	many	of	his	forecasts	have	been	“correct	for	the	wrong	reasons,	and	at	other	times	
incorrect	but	for	the	right	reasons”.	
Many	experts	interviewed	suggested	that	users	of	their	forecasts	had	different	needs	
anyway.	The	benefit	to	users	is	that	it	produces	a	picture	of	the	future	direction	of	the	
industry	from	which	business	planning	becomes	clearer.	If	this	is	so,	accuracy	is	
important,	but	so	is	a	well‐argued	justification	of	the	forecast	and	its	underlying	
assumptions.	This	seems	to	support	extensive	research	undertaken	in	the	USA	by	
Adams	(1986),	where	it	is	demonstrated	that	many	organisations	use	extensive	
econometric	models	because	of	their	ability	to	explain	an	entire	system.	This	allows	a	
structured	model	to	be	created,	representing	a	certain	paradigm	of	economic	thinking.	
Once	the	paradigm	is	built	it	remains	the	task	of	individual	firms	to	interpret	their	own	
reaction	to	it	in	the	form	of	a	business	plan.	
Furthermore,	the	survey	undertaken	by	the	American	Statistical	Society	of	major	
economic	variables	uses	an	average	of	a	range	of	individual	forecasters	and	thereby,	
according	to	Adams	(1986),	producing	successful	forecasts.	However,	the	issue	of	
averaging	forecasts	has	the	capacity	to	polarise	opinions.	
There	has	been	considerable	debate	by	Adams	(1986)	and	Winkler	and	Makridakis	
(1993)	about	the	merits	or	otherwise	of	simply	averaging	or	combining	point	forecasts.	
The	supporters	of	the	concept	suggest	that	it	brings	to	bear	different	perspectives	that	
are	not	explained	in	an	individual	model.	In	addition,	research	undertaken	by	Mills	
(1997)	showed	that	time‐series	forecasts	averaged	with	opinion‐based	forecasts	
outperformed	the	individual	forecasts	of	building	price	movements.	
Another	perspective	was	also	given	by	a	MBA	interviewee,	who	suggested	that	one	of	
the	advantages	of	averaging	was	that	it	allowed	a	group	of	forecasters	to	know	what	
others	have	been	thinking.	In	that	way,	it	may	lead	them	to	modify	their	forecasts	in	the	
light	of	other	alternative	views.	The	other	MBA	interviewee,	however,	believed	that	a	
broad	based	consensus	of	different	forecasts	could	discount	the	quality	of	the	best	
forecast	in	the	group,	and	therefore	will	not	improve	the	understanding	of	the	variable	
under	consideration.	
Consequently,	it	may	be	reasonable	to	suggest	that	predicting	the	future	level	of	any	
economic	variable	is	likely	to	remain	“art	form”.	Nevertheless,	as	McNees	(1981)	has	
pointed	out:	
To	adopt	perfection	as	the	appropriate	standard	for	forecast	evaluation	would	not	only	
be	naive,	but	counterproductive.	Naive	because	we	know	that	the	future	cannot	be	
predicted	perfectly,	and	counterproductive	because	experience	has	shown	that	less	than	
perfect	forecasts	provide	valuable	information	about	the	future.		
Conclusions	
This	research	has	been	limited	to	publicly	available	published	information	on	housing	
forecasts,	of	which	little	actually	exists.	Consequently,	it	has	been	difficult	to	gather	
sufficient	data	to	fully	explore	the	range	of	statistical	measures	necessary	to	
conclusively	identify	either	very	good	or	very	poor	forecasting.	
The	U‐statistics	results	indicate	that	the	IPC	method	is	an	improvement	over	simply	
using	a	naïve	approach.	In	other	words,	the	forecasting	did	add	value	by	improving	the	
accuracy	of	forecasts	compared	to	what	could	have	been	achieved	by	simpler	and	less	
costly	approaches.	In	addition,	the	forecasts	did	not	display	any	significant	inaccuracy.	
The	IPC	forecast	for	Australia	predicted	the	correct	direction	of	the	time‐series	between	
62	per	cent	and	92	per	cent	of	the	time,	a	result	that	seems	appropriate	under	the	
circumstances,	and	better	than	chance	alone.	
The	IPC’s	own	review	of	its	forecasting	(IPC,	1996)	suggested	that	determining	the	
direction	of	the	time‐series	may	be	more	important	than	the	accuracy	of	the	single	point	
estimates.	This	introduces	the	notion	that	forecasting	bias	can	be	an	important	indicator	
of	quality.	The	results	of	the	IPC	forecasts	do	not	display	any	consistent	bias	overall	but,	
by	their	own	analysis	of	the	events	(IPC,	1996),	there	were	circumstances	when	their	
forecasting	underestimated	the	length	of	downturns	and	predicted	recoveries	in	
advance	of	their	actual	occurrence.	In	other	words,	the	IPC	admitted	that	a	degree	of	
optimism	had	crept	into	their	forecasts	at	certain	periods.	
It	was	not	surprising	that	both	the	HIA	and	MBA	interviewees	suggested	that	their	
members	would	prefer	to	see	housing	activity	rise	rather	than	fall.	There	was	some	
evidence	of	forecasting	inefficiency	for	forecasts	four‐to	five	quarters‐ahead,	but	the	
effects	are	small	and	should	not	be	significant	to	individual	HIA	members	using	the	
information	for	business	planning	purposes.	
As	has	been	already	reported,	many	of	the	industry	experts	interviewed	believed	that	
improving	the	accuracy	of	housing	forecasting	would	be	a	desirable	goal.	However,	it	
should	be	said	that	they	were	less	clear	about	how	that	goal	should	be	achieved.	This	
research	did	not	attempt	to	quantify	the	economic	value	of	improved	forecasting,	nor	
was	any	attempt	made	to	determine	the	cost	of	producing	the	forecasts.	Consequently,	it	
was	not	possible	to	determine	if	the	benefits	of	improved	forecasting	outweigh	the	cost	
of	producing	the	forecast.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	HIA	or	the	IPC	did	not	recover	
the	full	cost	of	producing	housing	forecasts.	Instead,	these	organisations	produce	
forecasts	as	part	of	a	marketing	and	information	service.	
The	long‐term	planning	of	the	community’s	need	for	housing	must	be	high	in	the	minds	
of	both	government	policy	makers	and	private	sector	firms.	It	may	be	reasonable	to	
suggest	that	governments	have	an	interest	in	understanding	the	ongoing	development	
of	housing	and	for	self‐interest	alone	may	derive	benefit	in	encouraging	better	
forecasting	from	the	industry.	
In	conclusion,	it	may	be	useful	for	organisations	with	an	interest	in	housing	forecasts	to	
keep	a	record	of	accomplishment	of	their	own	forecasting,	or	alternatively	support	a	
register	which	monitors	the	track	record	of	forecasting	performance.	This	could	be	
similar	to	the	work	undertaken	by	Stephan	McNees	at	the	Federal	Reserve	Bank	in	
Boston,	USA.	
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Figure 1Australian housing starts 
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Figure 3One-quarter-ahead forecast errors 
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Figure 9Seven-quarters-ahead forecasts 
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